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REGARDING MACHINE STABILITY 
As all readers know, the CYBER 74 has recently been suffering a mysterious 
malady rendering it rather unreliable. A good system programming rule for this 
situation is; "don't rock the boat." In order that we do not introduce any 
new symptoms or in any way alter machine behavior, the new tape installation 
is postponed until Tuesday, 14 October. 
NOTICE OF CHANGES TO THE OPERATING SYSTEM 
E. J. Mundstock supplied a modification to CALLPRG which repairs continuation 
card processing and fixes documentation. 
N. L. Reddy supplied a modification to QFM which repairs processing of FET 
pointers· while dumping a queue file. The problem was actually causing lost 
information between dumping and reloading queue files. The problem is 
fixed by CDC at level 10. 
Bill Elliott added the following new options to EXAMINE: 
1. The B option allows salvage of data located past the EOI. 
2. The BS option allows adjustment of block sequence numbers on I format tapes. 
Trailer labels are also adjusted. Multi-file tapes are properly recovered. 
3. The format identification section was enhanced. 
K. C. Matthews made two small modifications to PP programs lAJ and 6DB in order 
to make the 6638 accessible to the CYBER 74. Equipment 0 in the CMRDECK is 
now assigned to the 6638. 
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE OPERATING SYSTEM 
Ever since the program BATCHER was introduced to the system, operators have 
complained mildly about the difficulty (if not the impossibility) of purging 
BATCHER from the ROLLOUT queue. Jim Mundstock has agreed to change BATCHER 
so that it is easier to purge from the queue. 
A user has requested that UCC supply a utility which displays "human readable" 
date and time in the job dayfile. Dennis Lienke submitted the following pro-
posal regarding this suggestion. 
I suggest that an excellent vehicle for such a message is in CTL~. It could 
easily put all the information on one line: 
CPU Time Wall Clock Date 
CTIME ~ ~ ~
The organization of the data is probably best to keep in 10 character segments» 
primarily for ease of reading by programs. 
A word as to time - I personally prefer military style time» a 24 hour clock» 
but some» perhaps many» users may perfer 12 hour am/~m style. With a bit of 
work, both styles may be listed. 
The important part is to put it all on one line. 
How about adding this feature to both CTIME and RTIME? - ed. 
K. C. Matthews is responsible for the following collection of proposals. 
I. Proposal for Higher Job Security 
This proposal relates to the security of special jobs on the system. 
Specifically» it will help Barry Fox write some accounting programs which 
users may call» but the security measures are general enough to be helpful 
for other users. 
Barry's program will attach a permanent file of accounting data for all users. 
His program will only list the data for the users account number, but data 
for all account numbers will be on the file. We propose to make the file 
a public file with a password. The password will be compiled into the 
accounting program~ 
The accounting program will be kept under CALLPRG. When the program file is 
attached» it will be an EXECUTE only file so that no one can read the 
program to find the file password. The program will call CPM to set 2 bits 
in the special one bit word (SOBW) in the control point area. One bit tells 
the system to clear core before the next control card is executed. This 
prevents users from examining core to look for secret data. (This bit is 
already operable in our system.) The second bit is the new one. It tells 
the system to treat this job like an SSJ= job as far as files are concerned. 
This means that all files that are attached or created after this bit is 
set~ get the special ID code 74B placed in the FST entry. Then, when the 
next control card is executed, all files with the 74B ID code are returned. 
Thus» even if a TELEX user interrupts the accounting program while it is 
running, he will not be able to examine the special files used by that 
program. 
The CPM function 72B added by Al Johnston will be generalized so that any 
bit in the SOBW word can be set by the user. This may have to be modified 
some day if we wish to add some bits in this word that not all users can 
set. 
The following routines will be modified: 
COMCMAC 
OBF 
to add an SETSOB macro for setting special bits. 
to allow a job to change a 74B ID file to a OOID file (00 is 
normal) without any special validation. 
set ID = 74B when creating a file if the new bit is set. 
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CPUMTR 
1AJ 
MODVAL 
ACLFAM 
CPM 
PPCOM 
Process the 72B CPM function code. 
Drop 74B ID files on the next control card. Also clear the 
two bits when control card is loaded. 
Use the macro to set the clear core bit. 
Use the macro to set the clear core bit. 
Document the function 72B. 
Document the new bit. 
II. Password Hashing 
This is (at last) the proposal for password hashing. A common deck 
COMPSPW will take the user number and password and scramble them to form 
a new 42' bit quantity called the scrambled password. The scrambled pass-
wo~d, (not the original password) will be stored in the VALIDUX file. 
MODVAL will be changed to call a new CPM function which will perform the 
scramble. Although it is inefficient to call a PP to do this, I think it's 
o.k. because it's done infrequently, and then the code to scramble pass-
words is then only in one place (the common deck COMPSPW). This will be 
done when account numbers are created or when passwords are changed. 
MODVAL also has to write the scrambled password to a file when it places 
all the account numbers on a source file. It must then accept these 
scrambled passwords when recreating the VALIDUX file from this source. CPM 
must also be changed to scramble the password when verifying account numbers. 
A similar change is also needed in ITA to process the scramble for TELEX 
log-ins. 
The implications of password hashing have been discussed several times in 
meetings of the Systems' Group, and are therefore, not going to be men-
tioned here. 
III. CPUMTR Track Hangs 
In processing the TRT (Track Reservation Table) monitor function requests 
for PP programs, CPUMTR often "hangs" the PP if there is something fishy 
about the request. (For example, if a PP drops a track that is not reserved 
in any track chain.) We sometimes have to unhang the offending PP in 
attempting to discover the cause of the problem. If there is really some-
thing wrong with the TRT, we would like no new files to be created on the 
device while we are looking around. This can be done by turning the device 
logically "off" in the system. (When the device is off, no permanent files 
for that device are honored.) I am proposing that CPUMTR turn the device 
off when an illegal TRT request is detected. It will still hang the PP. 
After the problem has been resolved, the device can be turned on by a console 
command. 
IV. MSAL Word Changes 
The MSAL word in low core can be used to force certain types of files to 
certain devices. Specifically, the five bytes of the MSAL word can force 
INPUT, OUTPUT, ROLLOUT, LOCAL, AND LGO files to special devices. Since it 
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v. 
is doubtful that we will ever want to force all local (i.e., temporary) 
files to device, I propose to use that byte of the MSAL word for short 
rollout files. We will then have the capability of putting short rollout 
files (from TELEX) on one device (ECS), and longer rollout files on another 
device (probably the 808). The following routines will be changed: 
PPCOM - to reflect the changed byte in MSAL. 
SET to set the correct byte at deadstart time. 
DSD to change the correct byte from the console. 
lRI to look at the two possible rollout devices. 
OBF to stop looking at the old local file byte. 
User ECS Changes 
There is a CMRDECK command which currently specifies the amount and location 
of ECS reserved for user ECS. We propose to add a field to that command 
which specifies also the maximum amount of user ECS that a single job may 
request. This will allow us to increase the amount of user ECS available, 
while still limiting a single job to 300K of ECS. The routines that will 
have to be changed are: 
PPCOM to document the maximum ECS field in central memory resident. 
SET to process the new field at deadstart time. 
MEM to use the new field for ECS requests. 
PEOPLE AND PROCEDURES: SYSTEM MAINTENANCE 
Larry Liddiard highly recommends two new NOS design documents regarding permanent 
files and control card language appearing in a recent VIM Newsletter. Copies 
of the documents will be distributed to Systems Group members during the Systems 
meeting on Thursday 09 October. 
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REVIEW OF PROPOSAL FOR JOB SECURITY 
The first line of the proposal says that it relates to the security of 
special jobs on the system. It does not. It relates to user programs. 
It enables user programs to assume in part the status of a special system 
job (SSJ), deriving thereby whatever file security the system provides for 
such jobs. 
The specific problem here is a small-scale version of the bigger problem 
of maintaining huge data banks.to portions of which many different people 
have access and the security of these banks from within and without. 
Validux is a well-known example of a file which has information pertaining 
to many thousands of users, who have access to information about themselves 
but not about each other. 
The person who maintains this data file always has to provide a service 
routine which can be called by different people, who have no direct access 
to the data file. The service routine however can get direct access to 
the file. This routine has to be a specialized one depending on a host of 
factors like the ~ucture of the data file, types of user accesses, etc. 
increasing in complexity as these factors get complex and as more security 
is demanded. In the case of validux, the system designers knew the structure 
of this file and the various types of accesses to it and had at their disposal 
various security measures that the system already had to protect itself from 
mischievous users. So they threw in a couple of more things like defining 
a Fast Attach File type and allowing only SSJ jobs to attach them. Thus the 
security design for files like validux is an integral part of the security 
design of the entire operating system. 
Now what about the poor user who wants to maintain something like a validux 
file? If the different categories of information he wants to supply out of 
this file are only a few, he can make individual files for the various 
categories (with password if necessary) and make each file available to one 
group of people so that one group does not learn about the other. Kronos 
can handle thousands of small files easily, and even a hundred files for this 
user should not be a problem to the system. 
If for some reason a user wants to maintain a single file as a data base 
and wants thousands of other users to have access to parts of this file 
under the control of his service program, he has at his command several user 
controls which will give him all the safeguards he would ever need. By the 
way, I cannot believe that there exists a need for such a usage (except 
Barry Fox). 
There are two problems: (a) Illegal access to the data file and (b) Privacy 
of each customer. In fact, with thousands of customers, (b) becomes more 
important and complicated than (a). We will consider only (a). 
The three things that would provide adequate safeguards against a mischievous 
user gaining direct access to the data file are: 
Revif~W of Proposal for Job Security 
1. No one should be able to '.'read" the service program to 
find out how it obtains access to the data file. 
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2. Make sure the service program can always return the data file, 
whether it hits a time limit or other errors. 
3. Should be able to clear core after its run so that core 
cannot be dumped to find' the method of access to the data 
file. 
The suggested solutions are: 
1. Make the service routine an execute-only file so that no one 
can "read" it. 
2. Using the macro EREXIT, ask the system to return control to 
some section of the program in the event of an error. If 
telex origin, use the macro DISTC to disable terminal control 
so that users cannot type in STOP or Interrupt effectively. 
3. At the end of the run, the service routine zeroes out the 
buffers of the data file and clears the code that obtains 
access to the data file. He may even use the EXCST macro to 
execute a control cardlike SETCORE to clear all of his memory. 
If there is enough demand for it, we can create a common deck to do all of 
these. We can also assemble this into a FORTRAN callable relocatable routine. 
It would have several entry points, as for example PRNPLOT has. An initial 
call would set the error exit, terminal control, etc. The file name, user 
password, etc. can be put in a common block and a call to a second entry 
point would attach this file and "remember" the file name in its own memory. 
A final call would return the file(s) and clear memory. 
I believe our responsibility to users should be to help their programming 
efforts by providing such common decks and subroutines and at the same time 
to keep the system overhead at a minimum. If the user wants to clear core, 
it should be with his CPU time. If he wants to return file(s), ·it should be 
at his cost. Those who know lAJ program would be familiar with the contortions 
it goes thru to process DMP=, SSJ= entry points. Such innovations have made 
systems programming easier but the system slower. For the sake of 1 out of 
10,0000) ' users who might need this feature, we should not permanently burden 
and enlarge frequently used programs like LFM, OBF, etc. These would have to 
check more words in control point area for each of the tens of thousands of 
times they are called in the hope that during one of those times a user might 
want them to do something. 
Considering Barry Fox's problem, he can either make it a system routine (O.K. 
even though he writes in FORTRAN) or use the above suggested safeguards. 
(N. Reddy 10/9/75) 
